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FOREWORD 
The Regional Issues Project at the International Institute for Applied Systems 
Analysis (IIASA) contains a major study of metropolitan processes and policies. This 
report by John Roy and Benje Johansson presents models for analyzing formation of the 
infrastructure for retail and service activities in a metropolitan region, complementing 
another study by the same authors, together with Giorgio Leonardi, WP-84-47, published 
by IIASA. Roy and Johansson analyze the formation of infrastructure in the form of 
private facilities in a setting of noncooperative, oligopolistic competition between differ-
ent types of economic agents. Thus, the report focuses on the policy formation of a re-
gional planning authority in a so-called "mixed economy", in which priority is given to 
cooperative solutions of Pareto-type and to equity criteria with regard to the outcome 
between firms, landlords, and inhabitants of the region. 
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Professor of Economics 
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Regional Issues Project 

Regional Science and Urban Economics 14 (1984) 433--452. North-Holland 
ON PLANNING AND FORECASTING THE LOCATION OF 
RETAIL AND SERVICE ACTIVITY 
John R. ROY* 
CS/RO Division of Building Research, Melbourne, Australia 
Borje JOHANSSON* 
Regional and Urban Development Group, II ASA, Austria 
Received October 1982, final version received January 1984 
In countries with mixed economies, planning authorities cannot usually enforce micro location 
and travel decisions of urban activities, but are confined to forming macro location and 
transport policy, within which agents can operate according to the market. An attempt is made 
here to describe such multilevel behaviour of the planning authority, landlords, firms and 
customers, and to obtain non-cooperative equilibria in terms of the controls exerted by each 
group. The behaviour of the market groups is described via entropy maximization, while 
alternative modes of behaviour are ascribed to the authority. In addition, a Pareto-type solution 
is examined. 
1. Introduction 
I.I. A brief historical review 
In earlier work on shopping models, such as that of Lakshmanan and 
Hansen (1965), an iterative framework was suggested for determining shop 
locations by minimizing revenue/capacity disbalances. In his general treatise 
on entropy models, Wilson (1970) introduced shopping travel models, which 
were later generalized by Coelho and Wilson ( 1976), and Harris and Wilson 
(1978) to consider shop location simultaneously. Mathematical programming 
versions were presented by Macgill and Wilson ( 1979), and convergence and 
stability properties were investigated by Phiri (1980), Clarke (1981), 
Beaumont et al. (1981) and Rijk and Vorst (1983). Bertuglia and Leonardi 
( 1980) described algorithms for handling log-accessibility transformations of 
the shopper objective under revenue/cost balance constraints. Recently, 
Leonardi (1981a, b) presented a comprehensive approach to public facility 
location problems, in the context of his leadership of the Facility Location 
Task Force at IIASA (International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis). 
*The authors are especially grateful to Paul Lesse, CSIRO Division of Building Research, 
Australia, for advice on the use of information theory concepts in such problems. 
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In parallel to this development, disaggregated behavioural approaches to 
these problems have been proposed, such as by Blommestein et al. (1980). 
However, it is considered that these methods are currently best suited for use 
in impact analysis, rather than in the broader-brush physical planning 
problems where aggregate models have been used traditionally. 
During the same period, considerable effort was being made in generaliz-
ing the form of entropy models, especially in considering the effects of a 
priori information and supply capacities. Contributions to this area were 
made, among others, by Fisk and Brown (1975), Dacey and NorclifTe (1976), 
Snickars and Weibull ( 1977), Batty ( 1978), Lesse et al. ( 1978), Brotchie et al. 
(1979) and Roy and Lesse (1981). Some of these ideas were applied to 
shopping models in Roy (1981). 
1.2. Motivations and scope of current paper 
There still remain significant differences between the model formulations 
suggested by major workers in the field. For instance, whereas Harris and 
Wilson (1978) define zonal attractiveness as the power Wj of endogenous 
floorspace terms WJ for each centre j, eq. (39) of Leonardi (1981 b) implies an 
attractiveness oi exp ( -A.ai), where ai is the exogenous operating cost per 
unit size in location j. In the current work, we account for zonal attractive-
ness in a way similar to Harris and Wilson (1978), but can also handle 
operating cost differentials in different zones within the planning authority 
objective. The model is derived using an entropy microstate approach, 
relating to distinct people making choices of distinct equivalent discrete 
amounts of shopping space, as already indicated in Roy (1981). 
Most current model solutions, such as that in Harris and Wilson (1978), 
can be interpreted as finding equilibrium points of two player games 
consisting of customers making their shop choices according to entropy (or 
surplus) maximization, and a planning authority determining the location 
and size of new centres to ensure a proportionality between total turnover 
and floorspace, as described in Roy and Lesse (1983). Although such 
equilibrium models represented a considerable advance in the state of the art 
upon their inception, they still have deficiencies, especially their neglect of 
externality effects. In addition, by identifying the macro spatial policy of the 
planning authority with the micro location decisions of the retailers, not only 
is the freedom of the latter overconstrained, but one is unable to incorporate 
consistently both the (sub-optimal) profit maximizing behaviour of the 
retailers as well as efficiency and equity criteria for the planning authority. In 
the current work, we attempt to overcome these difficulties by interpreting 
the problem as finding non-cooperative Nash equilibria of three player games 
[Intriligator ( 1971)]. The behaviour of the shoppers is described essentially as 
in the works mentioned earlier, except that proxies for shopping comfort and 
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convenience are introduced as 'qualitative' components of shoppi11>! centre 
attractiveness. The retailers are subdivided into various shop size clas-;cs, and 
their locational behaviour is described by entropy maximization under 
constraints upon profits. The planning authority controls the overall location 
and size of new centres according to weighted sums of efficiency criteria, or 
via satisficing approaches producing compromises between efficiency and equity 
criteria in the sense of Nijkamp (1978). Alternatively, a positive model of the 
authority is introduced, in which entropy maximization is used to describe 
the authority's behaviour. Finally, the landlords (i.e., shopping centre de-
velopers) are not represented as a fourth player with an objective function. 
However, they appear in the game with a predetermined behaviour (strategy), 
influencing the results by either providing exogenous rents and unit in-
frastructure investment levels to the system, or by receiving viable rents (and 
corresponding investment levels) as output which reflect the expected profits 
to be made by the retailers. The flow and decision structure of the model is 
illustrated in fig. 1. 
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* EXPECTED DISTRIBUTION OF SHOPPING TRIPS. 
Fig. 1. Flow and decision structure of model. 
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In addition to formulating the above equilibrium solutions, Pareto-type or 
cooperative solutions are also explored. These solutions represent the 
community's objective to coordinate the behaviour of all agents so as to 
reach a Pareto-satisfying result. Hence, pricing corrections to induce equilib-
rium need to be determined. In order to produce weighted objectives which 
include all three players, surplus representations for the players with entropy 
'objectives' must be obtained. For entropy problems with more than one 
behavioural constraint, considerable judgement is required to select the most 
appropriate surplus form. 
2. Some basic relations 
2.1. Shopper relations 
Consider that the potential shoppers are already located in residential 
zones i, and make Mi shopping trips during a given time. In this work, we 
concentrate on shopping trips for basics, and assume that, on the average, a 
shopper habitually buys these basics at one of the available centres. In order 
to simplify the indexing, shoppers are not subdivided into socio-economic 
groups in this formulation. However, some spatial segregation of income 
groups can be incorporated by specifying an average budget ai, taken to be 
available for shopping travel and shopping purchases for a typical resident in 
each zone i. Thus, if ciJ are the average travel costs incurred between zone i 
and centre j and di the parking charges (if any) at centre j, the average 
amount of money Yii available for purchases by a shopper from zone i 
travelling to shop at centre j is given as 
(1) 
If average price levels Pi for basics are given exogenously in each centre j and 
p is the average price over all centres, the value vii of goods purchased 
(normed to average price p) is 
(2) 
It is being assumed here that the price elasticity of demand is -1, i.e., the 
amount of money spent by an individual on purchases in any centre j is 
unaffected by the relative price levels Pi · However, the propensity to select a 
given centre j is affected by its average price level. 
In order to apply an entropy microstate approach to obtain a description 
of shopping travel, it is necessary to define a basic shop choice unit, 
characterized in Roy (1981) as an 'elemental' shop. In a sense, we seek a 
discrete representation, in terms of different shop 'size' classes k, of the 
usually non-linear relation between customer density and floorspace. From 
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Fig. 2. Typical specifications for discrete shop size classes. 
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empirical data, a curve of expected customers/unit area is plotted against 
shop floorspace down to the average floorspace w1 of the typical smallest 
shop where basics are purchased, as seen in fig. 2. Such a shop, with 
customers per unit area of c1 , is termed an elemental shop. Further shop size 
classes k are defined to reasonably interpolate the continuous relation of fig. 
2, and the total number of new shops F to be allocated are classified by size 
into groups Fk. In order to express the relative attractiveness power nk of a 
shop of size class k, we can see from fig. 2 that 
(3) 
where n 1 =1 for an elemental shop. Note that, if the curve in fig. 2 were close 
to being a horizontal line nk ~ 1 for all k, and only one shop class would be 
required. 
2.2. Retailer and landlord relations 
Consider the estimation of the number of shopping trips S1i between zone 
i and centre j as well as the number F1k of shops of size class k choosing to 
locate in centre j in addition to FJk shops already there. Due to varying 
accessibility to warehouses and bulk ordering arrangements, different 
averages buying prices pj may exist in different centres, and the transaction 
profits wii from a typical customer from zone i shopping in centre j are given 
as 
(4) 
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If rik is the average rent per shop of class k charged in centre j and g11 the 
average wage plus overhead bill for a shop of class k locating in j , then from 
eq. (1), the net profits E1 accruing to centre j become 
(5) 
Assuming that, on the average, profits within centres are distributed uni-
formly over their elemental shops, the average profit eik per shop of class k 
locating in centre j is given as 
(6) 
where Fi is the number of elemental shops in centre j, that is, 
If in any application, unit profits e1k in any centres j are computed to fall 
below a certain 'shut-down level' e1 <-> for the retailers, then the exogenous 
rents r1k are too high, given Pi and gik· From eq. (6), one may then 
determine a rent level such that e11 ~e1<->, enabling shops of type kin such 
centres j to become viable. Thereafter, the problem may be re-run with the 
reduced rent levels. 
Also, if expected annual unit infrastructure investment levels bi per 
expected shopper are provided by the developers, the total new private 
investment B comes out as 
B= '[,bi Sii. 
ij 
(7) 
Rather than the rents rik and wage plus overhead rates gi1 being given 
exogenously by developers, an alternative approach is to let them be 
computed endogenously from the standpoint of the retailers. Then, if in 
certain centres j , these rents turn out to be lower than a value r11 <-> required 
to provide a minimum viable return for the developers, the problem should 
be re-run using exogenous rents r11 <- > for such centres via eq. (5). Letting the 
wage plus overheads costs be 't per expected customer, the assumptions in fig. 
2 enable us to write g1k endogenously as 
(8) 
Assume that the landlords charge (and are expected to charge) a certain 
proportion e of the retailer's expected net unit profits (i.e., transaction profits 
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minus wages and operating overheads) in rent. Then, given eq. (8), we obtain 
the following average endogenous rent level r1t in centre of 
(9) 
which together with eq. (8), yields the profit relation (5) as 
(10) 
which, in contrast to eq. (5), just contains the shopper travel variables SIJ. 
3. Behaviour of main decision makers 
Except for the normative model of the planning authority, the behaviour 
of the key decision groups is described via entropy maximization. This 
provides a 'most probable' macro distribution in cases which may encompass 
diverse preferences, sub-optimal behaviour, heterogeneity across the options 
supplied and lack of perfect information. Note that, in contrast with most 
applications of game theory, it is not being assumed that such groups 
consciously maximize their entropy, but merely that entropy maximization 
provides a reliable description of their macro behaviour. After describing the 
statistics of the choice processes, constraint information expected to influence 
choice is introduced. The solution can be divided into two main phases, the 
estimating phase and the forecasting phase. In the estimating phase, the 
right-hand sides of these constraints are usually known, and Lagrange 
multipliers are determined which provide a 'best fit' to the observed 
behaviour. fhen, these multipliers (analogously to elasticities) may be used in 
the forecasting phase, where the right-hand sides of the constraints emerge as 
outputs. Certain smoothness and regularity assumptions are required to 
justify such a procedure. In addition, for models which embed user behaviour 
within planning objectives, a reasonable continuity between present and 
future planning policy must apply. Occasionally, completely new policy 
information may become available for the forecasting situation, leading to 
new constraints with known right-hand sides being added at this latter stage. 
So Jong as such policy changes are not too severe, the estimated Lagrange 
multipliers on the existing constraints are probably still reliable. The 
behaviour of the three main players is now described. 
3.1. Customer behaviour 
Because of the heterogeneity of shoppers and price and other variations 
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within shopping centres, shopper behaviour is usually more difficult to 
describe than that of the other agents. Firstly, both shoppers and their unit 
choices must be treated as distinct. Thus, from Roy (1981) and the definition 
of elemental shops in section 2.1, the number of potential choices N r by 
distinct shoppers each choosing a distinct elemental shop is given as the 
number of ways distinct shopper Mi living in residential zones i can choose 
among the 
distinct elemental shops in shopping centres j in groups Sil• allowing more 
than one shopper per shop, yielding 
( 11) 
Defining the entropy Sr as log (N r) and introducing the usual form of the 
Stirling approximation log x! = x(log x-1), we obtain the following entropy 
maximization problem: 
under the origin balance constraint 
L sij = M; Vi with the multipliers ).i· 
j 
(12) 
(13) 
The search for other relevant constraints seem currently more of an art 
than a systematic procedure. A macro theory of choice (consumer behaviour) 
would be required to select the set of potentially most important constraints. 
Otherwise, the actual selection must rely on statistical criteria applied to 
empirical observations. The set of constraints which best succeeds in 
explaining observed behaviour should be adopted. The associated Lagrange 
multipliers constitute parameters of a behavioural model which may be used 
for forecasting applications. In this spirit, the following preliminary set of 
:ontraints is chosen for the shop choice problem of eq. (12). Firstly, as we 
:onsider the value of goods which a shopper can obtain at any centre from 
!tis net shopping budget as a major factor in shopping centre choice, eq. (2) 
is used to write 
l,Si1v;1 = V, with multiplier a. 
ij 
(14) 
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The effect of shopping travel time tiJ between home and shops is included 
via the constraint 
l, SiJ tiJ = T, with multiplier v. 
lj 
(15) 
As proxy for shopping 'convenience', we include information on the average 
time m1 required to complete the shopping task in different centres j using 
l, Siimi = M, with multiplier (. 
lj 
(16) 
Finally, as a proxy for shopping 'comfort', the unit infrastructure investment 
levels b1 in each centre are proposed, which are included via eq. (7) with 
multiplier K. 
3.2. Retailer behaviour 
Retailers of different shop classes k are free to locate in their preferred 
centres. If current or prior shop location probabilities qik are available, then, 
following Snickars and Weibull (1977), retailer location behaviour may be 
described as finding the minimum information gain I according to the 
following process: 
under the market clearing conditions 
l,F1k =Fk V k with multipliers '1k• j 
(17) 
(18) 
where F,. is the total number of class k shops. Note that, if new shopping 
centres j are being added to those existing when q1k was observed, the 
relevant probabilities for new centres should be given as 
where N is the total number of centres, new plus existing. Then the original 
q1k are adjusted in proportion. 
In addition, we impose demand-supply floorspace relations in the following 
form: 
l,F1,.w,.=(1-r)ffj, with multipliers v1, 
k 
(19) 
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where r is the average shop vacancy rate and »-) the amount of floorspace 
allocated by the authority to centre j. Eq. (19) links the macro location 
policy »-) of the authority with the micro location decisions Fik of the 
retailers. If the vacancy rate r were expected to be rather large, it may be 
preferable to endogenize zonal vacancy rates r1 by incorporating the floor-
space supply capacities »-) directly into the objective of the retailers in eq. 
(17), as indicated in Roy (1981). 
In addition to the above 'accounting' constraints, economic constraints 
need also be applied. For endogenous rents and wage plus overhead rates, 
the profit constraints of eq. (10) are applicable, which are attached to the 
retailer objective with estimated multipliers µ1. The mixed constraints of eq. 
(5) for exogenous rents may alternatively be applied. Note that, as mentioned 
earlier in section 2.2, the profit constraints may change between eq. (10) and 
(5), if the former produce non-viable rents for the landlords. In addition, 
exogenous rents rik in eq. (5) may need to be reduced to ensure that certain 
retailers don't go bankrupt. If the landlords can't manage such reductions, 
the planning authority may well decide to intervene by the provision of 
corresponding rent subsidies. 
3.3. 1he planning authority 
It is considered that the planning authority has the power to allocate a 
total amount of new floorspace W in amounts Wi over shopping centres j. 
Both a normative approach as well as a descriptive or positive approach 
can be adopted here. Within the normative procedure, either a weighted sum 
of efficiency criteria for the three groups is maximized, or strong equity 
criteria are introduced. Alternatively, a satisficing approach, as suggested by 
Nijkamp (1978), can be used to provide a compromise satisfaction of both 
equity and efficienty criteria. In the positive model, planning policy is 
described using an entropy or information gain objective. On the other hand, 
each outcome of the nonnative model is a policy suggestion (prescription). 
Note that, Leonardi (198la, b) suggests the use of a consumer surplus minus 
operating cost objective for the planning authority. However, we believe that 
the consumer surplus objective is adequately catered for by the role of the 
customers in the game, and that the authority's policy can here be directed 
towards satisfying overall efficiency and welfare criteria which cannot be 
guaranteed by the market. For our positive model, the entropy objective of 
the authority can be regarded as a type of producer surplus. 
In our general formulation of the normative procedure, an efficiency 
criterion referring to all three groups is given as a weighted sum Z of 
transaction profits minus shopping travel costs minus operating plus annual 
capital costs z1 of the required public infrastructure. This rather altruistic 
policy of the planning authority presumes that it is constrained in some way 
to act in the 'public interest'. The objective is as follows: 
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where a 1 ~0, a2 ~ 0 and (a 1 +a2)~1. The weightings reflect importance 
judgements for the three criteria as well as their relative expected total 
contributions to the objective. If any floorspace allocations l1') fall below a 
minimum viable level Wmin• such potential centres should be omitted and the 
analysis repeated. 
As a market clearing constraint is associated with eq. (20), a maximum of 
(N - 2) extra independent constraints can be applied before the system 
becomes over-determined in terms of its N control variables J.i'). For 
instance, if equity criteria of equal units profits e per elemental shop for each 
centre are to be imposed, this introduces (N -1) independent relations and 
renders eq. (20) superfluous. From eq. (5), equalizing the profits e per 
elemental shop would yield the conditions 
(21) 
from which the unknown e value can be eliminated by summing over j. On 
the other hand, equity in average value of goods purchased per unit total 
zonal budget for each residential zone i implies the following conditions 
L S;ivii = vM;a; V;, 
j 
(22) 
where v is the unknown value ratio of goods purchased per unit total budget 
for a resident in any zone, eliminated by summing over i. Alternatively, we 
may try to equalize the average shopping travel time per elemental shop for 
each zone i. However, if the number of residential zones M is greater than 
the number of shopping centres N, the authority has insufficient policy 
instruments l1') to fulfil either of these criteria perfectly. 
For a satisficing approach, the objective of eq. (20) is used, as well as 
requiring that the relative spread between maximum and minimum values of 
unit profits ei or relative zonal purchased goods value levels v; should not 
exceed certain rations <5 1 and <5 2 respectively. So long as <5 1 and <5 2 are not 
made too small, less than (N -2) of the relevant constraints 
(23) 
as well as 
(24) 
R.S.U.E.-F 
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will be active, and system (20), so constrained, will not be overdetermined. 
Note that, an iterative approach must be used here, as successive guesses 
need to be made of the worst centres and zones and their respective unit 
profit and goods value levels by running system (20) initially as 
unconstrained. 
Finally, the case of a so-called 'positive' model of the authority is 
examined, where no explicit objective or set of objectives has been conveyed 
to the planner, but he must infer authority policy when making forecasts. 
Assuming a prolongation of past policy decisions, the analyst may use a 
Kullback information gain objective to describe the behaviour of the 
authority, using the approach suggested by Snickars and Weibull (1977). 
Thus, if the observed or a priori spatial policy probabilities q1 are defined as 
(WJ/W 0 ), the 'objective' I for the authority is to find the new planning 
policy Uj which implies minimum divergence from its past policy, in the 
form 
I =min I Uj log(Ji.j/qi). (25) 
WJ j 
If new centres are to be created, then equal probabilities qi =(1/N) are 
assigned for these centres and the q/s for existing centres adjusted in 
proportion, such that the relation Lqi = 1 is maintained. This expression 
replaces eq. (20) of the normative model. 
Direct use of eq. (25) for the positive model will imply a projection of 
observed planning policy into the future. However, if it is expected that any 
parameters in the system which will directly affect planning decisions are to 
change significantly in relative terms during the forecast period, constraints 
containing such parameters should be attached to eq. (25), and their 
multipliers obtained in the estimating phase. 
4. Some interactive equilibrium solutions 
4.1. Efficiency objective for the planning authority 
If the authority is taken to have the efficiency objective of eq. (20), the first 
solution step is to differentiate partially \he entropy objective, eq. (12), of the 
'lowest level' player, i.e., the customers, with respect to their decision 
variables Sii• including constraints (7) and (13) to (16). This process yields for 
SiJ 
(26) 
where, in forecasting applications, </>;i is the known sum ((Xvii+ vt;1 + (m1 + Kbi). 
Now, eq. (17) can be differentiated with respect to the retailer decision 
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variables Flt• together with constraints (18) and (19). However the profit 
constraints (5) or (10) must be applied also, whereby eq. (26) is used to make 
them functions of F1t alone. Considering firstly the case of endogenous rents 
in eq. ( 19), and eliminating A.1 from eq. (26) via constraints ( 13), we finally 
obtain 
(27) 
where 
From eq. (19) and (27), W1 is seen to be expressible monotonically in terms 
of Bi and Ct, which with Ai =e-\ allows the planning objective (20) to be 
given as 
with eq. (18) formed 
L,q1kh'J' Bj1 Ck =Fk Vk> j 
eq. (19) in the form 
L41th'J'wtB)1 Ck =(1-r)W, jk 
and eq. (13) , u~ing relations (26) and (27), as 
(28) 
(29) 
(30) 
(31) 
The above system and its constraints may be solved as an iterative sequence 
of geometric programs [Beightler and Phillips (1976)], where the value of the 
h1 term · is re-evaluated after every iteration - it is still necessary to 
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demonstrate convergence for this process. Alternatively, writing eq. (27) 
as f(F1k>B1,Ck)=0, we may use the calculus to write iJF1k/iJB1= 
-(of /iJB1)/(iJf /iJF1k) and iJF1k;ack = -(iJf/iJCk)/(iJf /oF1k) and solve the 
system by a linearized gradient approach. Numerical experiments will need 
to be carried out to see if the above procedures (or others) are reliable and 
efficient. After final solution for the A;, B1, and Ck variables, the expected 
retailer location decisions F1k may be obtained directly from eq. (27), the 
corresponding macro planning policy variables W; from eq. (19) and the 
expected shopping decisions SiJ from eq. (26). In addition, other information 
such as unit rent and staffing levels, unit profit levels, expected total 
infrastructure costs and zonal accessibility values may be readily computed. 
Note that, as the structure of this problem has some analogies with that of 
the two player game implied in the work of Harris and Wilson (1978), 
positive interior equilibrium solutions may not necessarily exist, especially 
when the curve in fig. 2 has a strong upward gradient. However, solutions 
with some of the W; values equal to zero may still exist, and may be useful if 
it is not required a priori to establish centres at all potential locations j. 
For the case of exogenous rents in eq. (5), the recommended solution 
procedure would be the same as for endogenous rents above. The only 
change would be the structure of the term h1. 
4.2. A positive model of the planning authority 
In this case, except for the inclusion of any extra constraints containing 
policy parameters which are expected to change significantly over time,1 
observed planning policy is essentially projected into the future. Using eq. 
(19) and (27), eq. (25) may be transformed to 
(32) 
under the constraints (29) and (30). Constraints (31) would not be required, 
as the expression (25) does not contain the shopper travel variables S;1 
explicitly. The multiplier A.; should be eliminated already from eq. (32) and its 
constraints no longer represent a conventional geometric program, thus 
either requiring the design of a specific algorithm for this problem or the use 
of a gradient approach. 
'Such a constraint may be an operating budget limitation L Ujz1 = Z. Inclusion of this would 
overcome the objection of Leonardi (1981b, bottom of p. 1095), as it would encourage 
concentration in low cost centres for low operating budgets Z. 
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The resulting solutions for Wi, Fi« and SiJ would then represent the 
expected behaviour of the system if the planning authority continued with its 
observed past policy. Any inequities or possible instabilities of the forecast 
solution could be explained to the authority, which may then decide on 
certain satisficing constraints etc. in an attempt to counteract these 
tendencies. 
4.3. Models to enhance equity properties of the system 
If the location policy Ji'} is used to ensure equal average unit net profits e 
in each centre, the retailers (if they are provided with this information) will 
ostensibly have no average incentive to move in the forseeable future, and a 
competitive equilibrium would be sustained. Eliminating e from eq. (21) by 
summing over j, eq. (5) or (10) may be used to write 
(33) 
where F is the known total number of elemental shops to be allocated. As 
the policy variables l-Jj are 'replaced' by the conditions of eq. (33), constraint 
(19) is no longer required in the retailer objective of eq. (17). Constraints (33) 
replace constraints (5) or (10), but the multipliers are unknown here, as the 
equity conditions are a planning prescription. This contrasts with the 
previous two sections, where the multipliers µi on constraints (5) or (10) were 
estimated according to observed profit levels Ei, and then used directly in the 
forecasting phase. A Newton-Raphson procedure may be used to solve this 
problem for Fik• after which the policy variables l-Jj can be obtained directly 
from eq. ( 19). Convergence properties of the procedure can be tested 
empirically. 
As explained in the consideration of constraints (23) and (24), a satisficing 
approach may be adopted to obtain a compromise between equity measures 
on profits and value ratios of purchased goods and the efficiency objective of 
eq. (20). Such constraints would replace the profit constraints of eq. (5) or 
( 10). However, the satisficing solution is probably numerically the most 
complicated, and much research will be required to obtain efficient and 
reliable algorithms. This is a worthwhile goal, as the ability to reasonably 
satisfy several criteria simultaneously seems most desirable. 
4.4. A market type model 
In some cases, the planning authority may not possess the power to 
allocate quantities of floorspace to new or existing centres, but may merely 
be able to designate certain spots throughout the urban area as potential 
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sites for such centres. In that case, the problem would essentially reduce to a 
two-player game between the customers and retailers. The customer objective 
would be given from eq. (26), and in the absence of constraint (19), the 
implicit retailer result would correspond to eq. (27) with the Bi term absent. 
One possible solution method may be to make an estimate of the F1k 
distribution, compute the factors h1, re-compute the Fik values, and so on, 
until convergence is obtained. Otherwise a Newton-Raphson procedure may 
have to be used. Then, the customer solution for SiJ can be obtained from 
eq. (26) using constraint (13). Finally, the expected floorspace requirements 
could be evaluated from eq. (19). 
Such a market solution would be of particular value to individual retailers 
and developers, as it could evaluate impact in cases where several competit-
iors simultaneously were planning construction of new centres, and one was 
uncertain of their expected location decisions in respect of alternative 
locations of one's own planned centre or centres. Of course, the solution may 
yield non-viable profit levels in certain centres, implying instability in the 
longer term. 
5. Some cooperative solutions 
5.1. Problem formulation 
In this section, a quasi-cooperative type of model is presented. From this 
model, one may derive policy measures which the community may use to 
coordinate the behaviour of all three agents, in such a way that a 
cooperative solution is obtained. The model may be used to generate a set of 
scenarios, each satisfying the Pareto criterion. It is then possible to compare 
the solutions and the associated policy measures. 
The model may be summarized as follows. A weighted sum of the 
objectives of the three players, i.e., the shoppers, retailers and planning 
authority, is maximizing simultaneously in terms of the decision variables of 
each player. As the efficiency objective for the planning authority, eq. (20), is 
expressed in monetary units, the entropy 'objectives' of the shoppers and 
retailers must also be transformed into an equivalent monetary form. Such 
equivalent surplus measures have already been derived for entropy problems 
with one cost constraint (usually a travel cost constraint), as illustrated by 
Champernowne, Williams and Coelho (1976). For instance, when the right-
hand side of the constraint is C and the estimated Lagrange multiplier p, the 
surplus is given as (S(P- C), where S is the system entropy. In our case with 
multiple constraints, it was decided to use the constraint (14) on the net 
value of shopping purchases for the shoppers, as this is the most important 
item for the customer. Thus, from eqs. (12), (26) and (14) to (16), the shopper 
surplus Ur is given as 
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(34) 
On the other hand, as profit maximization can be considered such a 
predominant motivation for the retailers, we choose to define the retailer 
benefit UL from eq. (10) directly as the total profit 
u L = ~sij(wij-r)(I -e). (35) 
IJ 
The criterion of the planning authority is taken as the combined efficiency 
objective Z of eq. (20), which indicates the authority's natural desire to 
minimize its own system operating costs, as well as a degree of 'benign 
interest' in the welfare of the participating firms and customers.2 Letting w 1 
be the community's exogenous weighting on shopper utility and w 2 that on 
retailer profits, the cooperative or Pareto-type problem may be defined as 
finding the maximum total community utility 0, in the form 
0= max [w 1 Vr+w 2 UL+(l-w 1 -w2 )Z] 
s;r F11 , w1 
(36) 
under constraints (13), (18) and (19). The relation oU/oSii=O with con-
straints ( 13) yields a similar expression to eq. (26), except that index </>ii is 
replaced by t/Jii =(</>ii -a/w 1 [w2(wii -r)(l -e) +(1 -w, -wz)(a.1 wii + Cl.zCii)]). 
Also oU/oFik=O with constraints (18) and (19) yields 
(37) 
which implies, in this case of endogenous rents, that the same relative mix of 
shops of each class k may occur in each centre j, that is 
(38) 
Assuming that Uj >0 for all j, oU/o ltj =0 with constraint (19) yields vi= 
-(1-w1 -w2)(1-a.1 -a.2 )z)(l-r}. With this relation and eqs. (18) and (38), 
the ratios l.,;Sii/Fi may be evaluated in eq. (37), which may then be solved 
2As the community is acting as the coordinator of the Pareto policy, it may be sometimes 
more realistic to give here the authority's objective Z as just the maximization of its own 
operating surplus. 
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with the modified eq. (26) simultaneously for S;1 and Fi, using the matrix 
approach presented by Harris and Wilson (1978). Thereafter, eq. (38) yields 
the retailer locations Fik and eq. ( 19) the macro planning policy variables HJ. 
5.2. Implementation policy 
Although the new macro retail location policy HJ could be imposed on the 
planning authority, the cooperative solutions for shop choice S;i and retailer 
location decisions Fik will not be in equilibrium, either with each other or in 
terms of the new macro location policy. For the Sii case, this is due to the 
modification of the <Pii terms in eq. (26) to l/J;i · For Fik • the solution of eq. 
(27) is obviously different to that of the cooperative case above for given S;i 
and HJ. 
In order to bring the cooperative solutions for Sii and Fik into equilib-
rium, certain pricing corrections are required. For Sii • one approach may be 
to use road or route pricing corrections Lic;i on the shopping travel costs cii• 
such that the market response term <Pii of eq. (26) for modified prices (c;i 
+L1c;1) equals the required Pareto response term l/Jii (see above) for the 
original prices cii. These relations enable us to solve for the corrections Lic;i· 
Road or route pricing may be extremely difficult to implement, even for 
public transport systems. An alternative is to approximate the effect by 
applying parking fee corrections Lidi of (L;S;1L1c;i)/(L;S;i) . On the other 
hand, the retailer location solution may be equilibrated by introducing rent 
corrections Lirik using the sensitivities µi on the profit constraints. 
It is well known that the cooperative (Pareto) solution enables a greater 
sum of benefits U to be achieved than the non-cooperative case. Neverthe-
less, a trade-off would need to be made between these expected extra benefits 
and the actual costs to the community of administering the differential 
coordinating pricing policies for parking fees and shop rents. 
6. Conclusions and recommendations 
A model framework has been presented which integrates the objectives of 
customers, firms and the planning authority in the location of new shopping 
and service centres. Certain one-way interactions with the landlords or 
property developers are included also. Within this framework, both a 
satisficing approach as well as a positive model may be selected with regard 
to the planning authority. In essence, the system consists of a set of coupled 
entropy models, where most of the Lagrange multipliers on cost or 
behavioural constraints are already obtained during the estimation phase, 
but the multipliers on the accounting or balance constraints are evaluated 
during the solution phase for the 3-player game. However, if reliable 
independent forecasts exist for the right-hand sides of any behavioural or 
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policy constraints (e.g., budgets and resource consumption values), these 
should be applied during the solution phase. The micro decisions of 
customers, firms and landlords are embedded within macro spatial policy 
decisions of the planning authority. Although, as such, the models represent 
an advance on those currently available, several problems need further 
attention. 
An immediate priority is to develop efficient estimation procedures which 
can handle multiple economic constraints, such as eq. (7) and (14) to (16) for 
S;i· Although some of the new models can be solved by known techniques, 
such as geometric programming and matrix approaches [see Harris and 
Wilson ( 1978), and Phiri ( 1980)], others require special iterative procedures, 
for which convergence needs to be demonstrated. Also certain non-
uniqueness problems and exterior solutions need to be examined [Rijk and 
Vorst ( 1983)]. 
Regarding the structure of the models, attempts should be made to include 
the landlords as a fourth set of actors in regard to their rent and investment 
decisions. For the retailers, one may consider endogenizing the average price 
levels Pi in each centre. In addition, for situations where there is a rapid 
turnover of retailers within centres, the strong market clearing assumptions 
of eq. (19) can be relaxed, and the vacancy rates ri treated as endogenous. 
Finally, in the longer term, shopping travel should be handled within the 
framework of activity analysis. In addition, qualitative aspects should be 
allowed to affect retailer and customer decisions by using multi-dimensional 
scaling techniques at the aggregate level. Above all, more time series data 
should be obtained, such that certain key assumptions may be validated. A 
study of the stability over time of the Lagrange multipliers is one such issue, 
which is also connected with the theory of choice and general systems theory. 
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